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STATEMENT OF ISSUES
Did the trial court correctly hold that the claims
against defendant Clearfield City are barred by governmental
immunity as set forth in Utah Code Ann. §63-30-3 as amended.
Did the trial court correctly conclude that the 1984
amendment to Utah Code Ann. §63-30-3 applies retroactively as
codification of prior case law.
Did the trial court correctly hold that Article I,
Section 22 of the Utah Constitution is not self-executing and that
there is no legislative authority allowing plaintiffs to sue pursuant to said constitutional provision.
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES
Utah Code Ann. §63-30-3 as amended and Article I, Section
22 of the Utah Constitution will determine the outcome of this
appeal.

The text of each provision is set out in Addendum A of

this brief.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiffs Rick and Cherlynn Hamblin have resided in a
home located at 576 North Barlow Street, Clearfield City, Davis
County, Utah, for approximately the past 11 years.
Home construction in the subdivision surrounding the
Hamblins1 home was commenced in 1978 or 1979, after the Hamblins
had moved into their home.

In conjunction with the commencement

of this subdivision, the slope of the land surrounding the home
was altered to alleviate soil slippage.

As a result of the

alteration in the elevation between the Hamblins1 home and other

-1.

homes in the neighborhood, rain and snow runoff is directed
towards the Hamblins' property.
The Hamblins began to experience flooding problems
beginning in May, 1981.

Subsequent attempts to correct the

deficient drainage system were made by Clearfield City but proved
ineffective.
The Hamblins assert that their damages were caused by
flooding due to improperly designed and constructed flood drainage
system in the vicinity of their home.

The damages to their home

has solely resulted from flood waters after severe rain storms.
The Hamblins continued to experienced flooding difficulties in ?82
and '83.
Suit was filed by the Hamblins against Clearfield City on
April 10, 1985, after Clearfield City refused to reimburse the
Hamblins for damages caused by flooding which occurred in the
latter part of 1984.
Clearfield City filed a motion for summary judgment on
November 6, 1985.

In the ruling on that motion, issued December

17, 1985, the district court ruled that the Hamblins1 action was
barred by Utah Code Ann. §63-30-3, as amended.

In the same

ruling, the district court also allowed the Hamblins to amend
their complaint to state a cause of action for inverse condemnation under Article I, Section 22 of the Constitution of Utah.
After hearing arguments on Clearfield City's second
motion for summary judgment on January 30, 1986, the district
court in a ruling issued April 29, 1986 granted Clearfield City's
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motion.

Subsequently, on June 23, 1986, judgment was entered

dismissing the Hamblins1 complaint with prejudice.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Hamblins1 action is barred by the 1984 amendment to
Utah Code Ann. §63-30-3 which provides absolute immunity to
Clearfield City.

Said statute should be applied retroactively as

clarification of the common law as enunciated in Reeder v. Brigham
City, 17 Utah 2d 298, 413 P.2d 300 (1966).

The legislative

history of §63-30-3 establishes that it was the legislative intent
that the amendment apply retrospectively to causes of actions
arising prior to the effective date of the amendment.
This court has previously held tha£ Article I, Section 22
of the Utah Constitution is not self-executing and that without
legislative consent, the cause of action under Article I, Section
22 is prohibited.

Furthermore, the theory of "inverse condem-

nation" has not been recognized in Utah.
Without legislative authority, the Hamblins1 remedy is
limited to recovery under the lawful exercise of eminent domain.
However, under the exercise of eminent domain a party may not
recover damages unless the alleged injuries are a result of the
direct, necessary, and unavoidable consequences of the right of
eminent domain.

Equitable estoppel is not applicable in this

action inasmuch as the Hamblins1 claim was barred prior to the
enactment of the 1984 amendment to Utah Code Ann. §63-30-3 under
the case law previously announced by this court.

Finally, there

is strong public policy reasons why Clearfield City should be

--}-

granted immunity from suit with regards to the management of flood
waters and storm drainage systems,
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE CLAIMS AGAINST CLEARFIELD CITY ARE
BARRED BY THE 1984 AMENDMENT TO UTAH CODE
ANN. §63-30-3, WHICH PROVIDES ABSOLUTE
IMMUNITY TO CLEARFIELD CITY.
In 1984, the Utah Legislature amended Utah Code Ann.
§63-30-3.

As amended, §63-30-3 now reads as follows:
Except as may be otherwise provided in
this Chapter, all governmental entities
are immune from suit for any injury which
results from the exercise of a governmental function, governmentally-owned hospital, nursing home, or other governmental
health care facility, from an approved
medical, nursing, or other professional
health care clinical training program conducted in either public or private
facilities.
The management of flood waters and other
natural disasters and the construction,
repair, and operation of flood and storm
systems by governmental entities are considered to be governmental functions, and
governmental entities and their officers
and employees are immune from suit for any
injury or damage resulting from those activities. (Emphasis added).

Thus, as amended, §63-30-3 clearly grants immunity for
all governmental entities and their respective officers and
employees for any injury or damage resulting from the management
of flood waters and from the construction, repair, and operation
of flood and storm systems.
The second paragraph of §63-30-3 is a blanket grant of
immunity that is not, unlike the first paragraph of §63-30-3, sub-

ject to the waivers of immunity found in the later sections of the
Utah Governmental Immunity Act.

In other words, the immunity

granted by the second paragraph of §63-30-3, as amended, does not
contain a clause "except as may be otherwise provided in this
chapter.ff

The only rational statutory construction of the second

paragraph of §63-30-3 is that the 1984 amendment provides total
immunity for the acts specified in that paragraph, i.e., immunity
for any injury or damage resulting from the management of flood
waters or from the construction, repair, or operation of flood and
storm systems by governmental entities.
In addition, this court heretofore has held that the
operation of a subsurface storm drainage system is a governmental
function for purposes of governmental immunity.
City, 17 Utah 2d 298, 413 P.2d 300 (1966).

Reeder v. Brigham

In Reeder, the plain-

tiff's lands were flooded from diverted surface and percolating
waters from the defendant municipality's man-made storm and
drainage system.

The controversy arose in the northeastern part

of Brigham City, which had experienced a building boom on the
grounds which originally had been mostly cultivated orchard lands.
When the orchard lands were converted to housing, an underground
drainage system was established, curbs and gutters were built, and
roads were hard-surfaced by the defendant municipality.

In 1962,

for the first time, waters from the drainage system and those
which had accumulated from the curbs, gutters and roads were
channeled into an underground drainage system and discharged into
a ditch.

Before the curbs, gutters and roads were built, the

plaintiff's lands were never flooded during times of heavy rainfall or spring runoffs, but following said installations, the
plaintiff1s lands were flooded.

The plaintiff brought action

seeking to enjoin the municipal corporation from diverting surface
and percolating waters into the man-made storm drainage system.
The lower court granted the injunction and awarded the plaintiff
nominal damages.
On appeal, the defendant municipality contended that it
was not subject to liability for damages because it was acting in
a governmental capacity.

In sustaining the defendant's conten-

tion and overruling the lower court's decision, this court held
that the operation of a storm drainage system is a governmental
function for the purposes of governmental immunity.
Although the governmental/proprietary function dichotomy
used by the court in Reeder has been subsequently rejected in
Standiford v. Salt Lake City Corp., 605 P.2d 1230 (Utah 1980),
Utah Code Ann. §63-30-3 as amended, provides that governmental
actions to prevent or mitigate flooding is a governmental function
for purposes of governmental immunity.

Therefore, it is clear

that Clearfield City is immune from any suit, including the
instant action arising out of the municipality's construction,
operation, and maintenance of a flood and storm system.

To allow

the Hamblins to maintain an action against Clearfield City in the
instant case would be in direct contravention of the legislative
intent surrounding the Utah Governmental Immunity Act and the
express language of Utah Code Ann. §63-30-3.

This is not a case of first impression at the district
court level. At least five district court judges in the State of
Utah have already ruled that the 1984 amendment to Utah Code Ann.
§63-30-3 provides absolute immunity for governmental entities from
suit for any injury or damages resulting from the management of
flood waters or the construction, repair, and operation of flood
and storm systems by governmental entities.

The the Honorable

Scott Daniels so ruled in the case of Brakensiek v. Dixie South
Corp., No. C84-0564 (3rd Dist. Salt Lake County 1984); the
Honorable David Samm so ruled in the case of Palmer v. State Farm
Insurance Co., No. 7732 (4th Dist. Millard County 1984); the
Honorable Cullen Christensen so ruled in the case of Chesley v.
Delta City, No. 7486 (4th Dist. Millard County 1984); the
Honorable J. Robert Bullock so ruled in the case of Fairchild v.
State of Utah, No. 7733 (4th Dist. Millard County 1984); the
Honorable George Ballif so ruled in the case of Mendenhal v. Orem
City, No. 62597 (4th Dist. Utah County 1984).
through

ff

Flf,

See Addendum lfB"

respectively.
POINT I I .

THE 1984 AMENDMENT TO UTAH CODE ANN.
§63-30-3 IS APPLICABLE TO THE INSTANT
ACTION AND SHOULD BE APPLIED RETROACTIVELY
AS A CLARIFICATION OF THE COMMON LAW.
Although the 1984 amendment to Utah Code Ann. §63-30-3
was not made explicity retroactive to causes of action arising
prior to the enactment of the amendment, this court decided the
issue of the retroactive application of the 1984 amendment in
Frank v. State, 613 P.2d 517 (Utah 1980).

In Frank, the plain-

tiff's son was admitted to the University of Utah Medical Center
for psychiatric treatment.

While undergoing treatment, the son

committed suicide in March, 1976.

The plaintiff brought suit,

alleging that the defendants were negligent in their treatment of
his son.

In 1978, the Utah Legislature amended Utah Code

Ann. §63-30-3 to provide governmental entities immunity from suits
arising from state and local government providing medical treatment.

The 1978 amendment is now the first paragraph of Utah Code

Ann. §63-30-3, as amended.

The State of Utah moved for summary

judgment on the grounds that the State of Utah was protected by
sovereign immunity as defined under the 1978 Act.

This motion was

granted.
On appeal, this court reversed on other grounds but
clearly ruled that the 1984 amendment, while not made expressly
retroactive by the legislature, should be so applied even though
the plaintiff's cause of action had arisen prior to the effective
date of the amendment.

The holding in Frank is indistinguishable

from the pending case except as this action relates to the second
paragraph of Utah Code Ann. §63-30-3.
In addition, the legislative history of Senate Bill 97,
which amended Utah Code Ann. §63-30-3, makes clear the legislature's intent that the amendment apply retrospectively to

causes

of action arising prior to the effective date of the amendment.
The first paragraph of Senate Bill 97 describes the statute as "an
act relating to flooding; clarifying flooding as a governmental
function for purposes of governmental immunity . . ."

(Emphasis

added).

It is significant to note that the legislature in

enacting the 1984 amendment to Utah Code Ann. §63-30-3 was
clarifying an immunity that the legislature considered to have
always existed.

The enactment of the 1984 amendment supports the

holding in Reeder v. Brigham City, 413 P.2d 300, that local
municipalities are immune from suit from causes of action arising
out of the construction, operation, or maintenance of flood water
drainage systems. A copy of Senate Bill 97 is attached as
Addendum "G".
Thus, it is not necessary to show that §63-30-3 is
retroactive.

Even if the court in this action

follows

the common

law as announced in the Reeder decision, the Hamblins would not be
entitled to recover.

However, the law is absolutely clear that

§63-30-3 denies recovery and that it should be applied retroactively as a pronouncement of the existing common law.
POINT III.
ARTICLE I, SECTION 22 OF THE UTAH
CONSTITUTION IS NOT SELF-EXECUTING AND
DOES NOT GIVE CONSENT OF THE STATE TO BE
SUED.
This court has held that Article I, Section 22 of the
Constitution which provides that property should not be taken or
damaged for public use without just compensation is not selfexecuting.

The Court stated in Fairclough v. Salt Lake County, 10

Utah 2d 417, 354 P.2d 105 (1960),
. . . [Consistently and historically we have
ruled that the State may not be sued without
its consent; taken the view that Article I,
Section 22 of our Constitution is not selfexecuting, nor does it give consent to be

sued, implied or otherwise; and that to
secure such consent is a legislative matter,
a principle recognized by the legislature
itself.
id. 354 P.2d at 106.
The Fairclough case involved an action by property
owners against the Utah Road Commission for damages incurred when
the Road Commission constructed a highway project where the grade
level was reduced to about 16 feet below the owner's abutting
land.

This court held that the state could not be sued without

its consent and that Article I, Section 22 was not self-executing
and did not constitute consent by the state to be sued.
As stated in Fairclough, this court has consistently
recognized that in order for the state or its subdivisions to be
sued, the legislature must provide for the method.

The legisla-

ture has also recognized this principle and has provided for suits
to be filed against the state by creating the Utah Goverraental
Immunity Act and by providing legislation for recovery under the
exercise of eminent domain.
Judge Robert Bullock recognized that the Utah Supreme
Court had held that Article I, Section 22 was not self-executing
when he wrote his dissenting opinion in the case of Andrus v.
State, 541 P.2d 1117, 1122 (1975).

In Andrus, a homeowner

brought an action to recover for damages sustained to his home
and property from flood waters allegedly resulting from the
negligent construction of a highway project.

This court stated

that the state was not immune from suit for damages caused by the
highway construction project under the Governmental Immunity Act.

Judge Bullock dissented on the sole ground that the plaintiff
sought to recover against the state under Section 22 of Article I
of the Constitution pursuant to the doctrine of "inverse condemnation11 rather than under the Utah Governmental Immunity Act.

In

taking that position, Judge Bullock recognized that the decisions
of this court, unless overruled, precluded such result.

In other

words, Judge Bullock was arguing that Section 22 of Article I
should be self-executing and that a party should be allowed to sue
the state without the state's consent.

However, as indicated

above, case law indicates that Section 22, Article 1 of the Utah
Constitution is not self-executing and without legislative enactment, a party may not sue the state or its subdivision without the
state consenting to suit.
In the present case, the legislature has not provided a
method which would enable the Hamblins to collect damages from
the City of Clearfield under the provisions of Article I, Section
22.

In fact, the legislature has specifically stated by enacting

§63-30-3 of the Utah Code Ann. that the management, construction,
repair and operation of flood and storm systems by governmental
entities are to be considered government functions and as such,
the government entity is immune from suit for any injury or
damage.

Thus, the Hamblins may not recover under the Utah

Governmental Immunity Act.

The Hamblins1 oply claim under Article

I, Section 22 of the Constitution is under the lawful exercise of
eminent domain.

However, even under the exercise of eminent

domain, consequential damages are not recoverable.

_i 1 _

POINT IV.
ARTICLE I, SECTION 22 OF THE UTAH
CONSTITUTION DOES NOT ENTITLE THE HAMBLINS
TO RECOVER CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES.
As stated above, without legislative authority a party
may not recover under Article I, Section 22 of the Utah
Constitution.

Recovery under Article I, Section 22 is limited to

the lawful exercise of eminent domain.

However, even under the

exercise of eminent domain a party may not recover for damages
unless the alleged injuries are a result of the direct, necessary,
and unavoidable consequences of the right of eminent domain.

Such

was the holding in the case of Lund v. Salt Lake County, 58 Utah
546, 200 P. 510 (1921).

In Lund, the plaintiff brought an action

against Salt Lake County to recover damages for injury to certain
fish ponds and destruction of fish contained therein situated in
Salt Lake County.

Near plaintiff's property, the County had

constructed and was maintaining a reservoir in connection with its
water supply system.

Following the flushing of the reservoir,

impure water was allowed to flow into plaintiff's fish ponds
resulting in damage to the fish ponds and destruction of the fish
contained therein.

Plaintiff alleged that he was entitled to com-

pensation on the theory that Article I, Section 22 of the Utah
Constitution provided that private property shall not be taken or
damaged for public use without just compensation.
In discussing Article I, Section 22, this court stated:
We are clearly of the opinion that the
damages for which compensation is allowed
under Article I, Section 22, of the State
Constitution are such as are the direct

consequences of the lawful exercise of the
right of eminent domain, and that ordinarily such damages are unavoidable.
id. 200 P. at 514.
This court held that the plaintiff could not recover
because of the damages incurred were not the result of the direct
consequence of the exercise of the right of eminent domain.
Likewise, in the present case, there has been no taking
or damaging of the Hamblins1 property which is a result of the
direct, necessary, and unavoidable consequences of the exercise of
the right of eminent domain; in fact there has been no exercise of
the eminent domain powers.
The Hamblins claim that they are entitled to compensation
for their property under a theory of "inverse condemnation.11
The Hamblins have cited the case of Hampton v. State, 21 Utah 2d
342, 445 P.2d 708 (1969), in support of this proposition.
However, the Hampton case involved a condemnation action in connection with the construction of a highway.

Under those cir-

cumstances, there was a statutory right to bring the action.

In

the instant case, there is a statutory prohibition against
bringing the action and therefore the provisions of Article I,
Section 22 are not available to the plaintiffs.
The Hamblins cite Weber v. Salt Lake City, 40 Utah 221,
120 P. 503 (1911), as authority that substantial interference with
the use and enjoyment of property amounts to a taking of property
under Article I, Section 22 of the Utah Constitution.

The Weber

case, however, involved the lawful exercise of the right of emi-

nent domain and the removal of soil which supported the plaintiff's retaining wall.

Because the damages claimed were the

direct consequences of a lawful exercise of the right of eminent
domain, the plaintiff was entitled to recover.

Again, in the pre-

sent case, there are no damages which are a result of the direct
consequences of the lawful exercise of the right of eminent
domain.
In those cases involving eminent domain, recovery has
been allowed when there has been an actual taking of property.
Such were the facts in State v. Williams, 22 Utah 2d 331, 452
P.2d 881 (1969).

In Willi ams, the appellants/defendants sought

compensation for alleged damages when the State in widening and
improving its highway, took a 37 foot strip of defendant's land
which caused the traffic to be nearer to defendants' home than it
formerly had been.

In a condemnation proceedings, the defendants

were awarded $750 for the value of the land, and it also found
that the defendants' land was depreciated in the sum of $3,896 for
greater traffic noise due to the fact that the traveled portion of
the improved highway was closer to the defendants' residence.

The

trial court did not allow recovery of the $3,896 for the depreciated value of the property because the damages were not a direct
result of the taking of defendants' land.

This court upheld the

trial court and stated that all damages not caused by the taking
or the severing of the land or the manner of the construction of
the improvements are consequential and are not within the protection of Article I, Section 22 of the Constitution which provides

1 /.

that private property shall not be taken or damaged from public
use without just compensation.
The Harablins cite in their brief the case of Hubble v.
Cache County Drainage Distr. #3, 120 Utah 651, 237 P.2d 843
(1951).

In Hubble, this court held that a drainage district

created by statute could not increase its system or facility so as
to create additional burdens on the land of those outside the
district without responding in damages, resorting to eminent
domain, or being subject of an injunction.

The Hubble decision,

however, is inapplicable in the present case because there are no
drainage districts involved.

This court has held that drainage

districts are not governmental bodies and as such are not subject
to the sovereign immunity which the City of Clearfield is entitled
to under §63-30-3 of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act.

In

Nestman v. South Davis County Water Improvement Dist., 16 Utah 2d
198, 398 P.2d 203 (1965), this court stated:
It is significant to note that the defendant
water district is somewhat different in
character than the governmental bodies which
have historically been accord in sovereign
immunity. It is not an entity created
directly by the legislature or by the
Constitution and cannot properly be regarded
as the same type of sovereign entity as an
arm of the agency of the state government,
or as a city or a county.
Ld. 398 P.2d at 204-205.
The Hamblins have failed to cite any cases in which a
Utah district court or this court has ruled that the provisions of
§63-30-3 are unconstitutional and in violation of Article I,
Section 22 of the Constitution.

_1^_

Rather, Clearfield City has cited this court's decision
of Fairclough v. Salt Lake County, 354 P.2d 105, which specifically held that Article I, Section 22 is not self-executing.
Further, Clearfield City has cited six different district court
judges in the State of Utah which have ruled that §63-30-3 provides an absolute immunity for governmental entities from suit for
any injury or damages resulting from the management of flood
waters.

The Harablins have failed to cite any case law either on

the district court level or the Supreme Court level in which their
position has been followed.
POINT V.
EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL IS NOT APPLICABLE
INASMUCH AS CLEARFIELD CITY HAS NOT
INTENTIONALLY OR OTHERWISE INDUCED THE
HAMBLINS INTO A COURSE OF ACTION NOR
HAVE THE HAMBLINS SUFFERED INJURIES OR
INJUSTICE AS A RESULT OF CLEARFIELD CITY'S
ACTIONS.
The Hamblins assert that Clearfield City should be
estopped from claiming governmental immunity since Clearfield City
paid some of the claims submitted by the Hamblins, and that they
relied on the actions of Clearfield City and delayed filing suit
against Clearfield City.

The Hamblins claim that as a result,

they filed their action after the immunity amendment was passed by
the Utah Legislature, thus barring their claim.
In more than one instance, the Utah Supreme Court has
defined the elements of equitable estoppel.

In Morgan v. Board of

State Lands, 549 P.2d 695 (Utah 1976), the Utah Supreme Court
stated:

Estoppel is a doctrine of equity proposed to rescue from loss a party who has,
without fault, been deluded into a course of
action by the wrong or neglect of another.
The measure we apply to plaintiffs1 claim of
estoppel is an adaptation to this case of
the standard heretofore approved by this
court: Estoppel arises when a party
(defendant) by his acts, representations, or
omissions, or by his silence when he ought
to speak, intentionally or through culpable
negligence, induces another (plaintiffs) to
believe certain facts to exist and that such
other (plaintiffs) acting with reasonable
prudence and diligence, relies and acts
thereon so that he will suffer an injustice
if the former (defendant) is permitted to
deny the existence of such facts.
I_d. at 697.
In Celebrity Club, Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control, 602 P.2d
689 (Utah 1979), the court stated:
The elements essential to invoke the
doctrine of equitable estoppel are:
(1) An admission, statement, or act
inconsistent with the claim afterwards
asserted,
(2) Action by the other party on the
faith of such admission, statement, or act,
and
(3) Injury to such other party
resulting from allowing the first party to
contradict or repudiate such admission,
statement, or act.
Id. at 694. More recently, the Utah Supreme Court has stated that
the elements of equitable estoppel are "conduct by one party which
leads another party, in reliance thereon, to adopt a course of
action resulting in detriment or damage if the first party is permitted to repudiate his conduct."

Blackhurst v. Transamerica Ins.

Co., 699 P.2d 688, 691 (Utah 1985), quoting from United American
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Life Ins. Co. v. Zions First National Bank, 641 P.2d 158, 161
(Utah 1982).
From the foregoing, it is apparent that equitable estoppel would be available under the present action only if the
Hamblins can establish that Clearfield City, by its payments of
certain claims, intentionally acted to induce the Hamblins to
delay the filing of their lawsuit until the legislature passed the
1984 amendment to §63-30-3 of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act.
Furthermore, the Hamblins must establish that they have suffered
harm as a result of the actions of Clearfield City.
It cannot be seriously claimed that Clearfield City
"lulled" the Hamblins into delaying the filing of their action
until the Utah Legislature passed the immunity amendment.

On the

contrary, Clearfield City was acting in good faith when it honored
the Hamblins1 claims.
As stated above, the enactment of the 1984 amendment to
Utah Code Ann. §63-30-3 is simply a pronouncement of the common
law previously established by this court.

The Hamblins could have

filed their suit on the first day they experienced flooding and
their claim would have still been barred under Reeder v. Brigham
City, 413 P.2d 300.

Inasmuch as the appellant Hamblins have not

suffered detriment or damage as a result of the actions of
Clearfield City, the doctrine of equitable estoppel is not
applicable in this action.

POINT VI.
THERE ARE SOUND PUBLIC POLICY REASONS WHY
THE COURT SHOULD AFFIRM THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT
FOR CLEARFIELD CITY.
The management of flood waters and storm drain systems
are a necessary function of government and the consequences of
the same may subject private landowners to damages.

Thus, we see

there are many areas of the State of Utah in which flood waters
have caused serious damages.

The damage to property surrounding

Utah Lake and the Great Salt Lake and the damage to property in
Thistle, Utah, are examples of private landowners suffering
serious damages as a result of flood waters.

So also are

numerous homeowners who have been flooded as a result of rivers
overflowing their banks or storm drain systems backing up or
overflowing.
It has been determined by our legislature that the risk
of loss under these circumstances shall not be borne by the
municipality but rather by the individuals or by their insurance
carriers, as the case may be.
If the court were to rule that Clearfield City has an
obligation to exercise eminent domain and compensate the Hamblins
for their property, it would set a dangerous precedent upon which
any landowner similarly situated could make similar claim.

Our

legislature has specifically precluded such liability and this
court should not substitute its judgment for the legislative
mandate.

CONCLUSION
The Harablins1 claim against Clearfield City is clearlybarred by the Utah Governmental Immunity Act and the 1984 amendment to Utah Code Ann. §63-30-3 is applicable to this case as a
pronouncement of the common law previously established by this
court.

As such, equitable estoppel is not applicable since the

Hamblins1 claim would have been barred by common law prior to the
1984 amendment.

Furthermore, this court has consistently

recognized that Article I, Section 22 of the Utah Constitution is
not self-executing, and without legislative authority, a party may
not sue the state or its subdivision without the state's consent.
The legislature has denied the plaintiffs authority to sue
Clearfield City by amending §63-30-3 of the Utah Governmental
Immunity Act.

Since the Hamblins may not recover under Article I,

Section 22 of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, their recovery
can only be made under the exercise of eminent domain.

This

action does not involve eminent domain and even if it did,
appellants could not recover damages unless such damages were the
direct, necessary, and unavoidable consequences of the right of
eminent domain.

Any damages the Hamblins have suffered would be

construed under case law as consequential.
of the district court should be upheld.

Therefore, the ruling

Dated this 2nd

day of

December

t

1986.

STRONG & HANNI

-Henry E. Heathy
CHRISTENSEN^ JENSEN & POWELL

Robert
Attorneys for Defendant/Respondent
Clearfield City

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that four true and correct copies of the
foregoing Brief of Respondents was mailed, first class postage
prepaid, this

3rd day of

December

1986, to the

following:
Kelly G. Cardon
Kelly G. Cardon & Assoc.
Attorney for Plaintiffs/Appellants
Rick and Cherlynn Hamblin
427 27th Street
Ogden, Utah 84401
~
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ADDENDUM A
Utah Code Ann. §63-30-3 as amended:
Except as may be otherwise provided in
this chapter, all governmental entities are
immune from suit for any injury which
results from the exercise of a governmental
function, governmentally-owned hospital,
nursing home, or other governmental health
care facility, and from an approved medical,
nursing, or other professional health care
clinical training program conducted in
either public or private facilities.
The management of flood waters and
other natural disasters and the construction, repair, and operation of flood and
storm systems by governmental entities are
considered to be governmental functions, and
governmental entities and their officers and
employees are immune from suit for any
injury or damage resulting from those
activities.
Article I, Section 22 of the Utah Constitution:
Private property shall not be taken or
damaged for public use without just compensation.

ADDENDUM B

ROBERT H. HENDERSON
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Defendant
Sandy City
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
P. 0. 3ox 3000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
Telephone:
(801) 521-9000
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Sell L^v-'C:-b-ry u::.r.
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IN TF.Z THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ALLAN L. 3RAXENSIEK and
MARILYN 3RAKENSIEK,
:

ORDER

Plaintiffs,
v.
DIXIE SIX CORPORATION, SALT
LAKE COUNTY and SANDY CITY,
Defendants.

:
:

Civil No. C84-0564
Judge Scott Daniels

:

The Motions to Dismiss of the defendants Dixie Six
Corporation Salt Lake County, and Sandy City came before

the

Court on the regular law and motion calendar on May 11, 1984 r
the Honorable Scott Daniels presiding, at 2:00 p.m.

The

plaintiffs were represented by David Scofield of the law firm
of Parsons and Crowther.
by Craig G. Adamson.
A. Livingston.

Dixie Six Corporation was represented

Salt Lake County was represented by Roger

Sandy City was represented by Robert H. Henderson

of the law firm Snow, Christensen & Martineau.

The Court having

heard the argument of.counsel, and having reviewed the memoranca
on file, and the Court being fully advised in the premises, and

the Court being of the opinion that Utah Code Annotated § 62-30-3
as amended in 19B4 provides absolute immunity to governmental
entities from suit for any injury or damage result from management
of flood waters and the construction, repair, and operation of
flood and storm systems by governmental entities, and the Court
being of the further opinion that the 1984 amendment to Utah
Code Annotated § 63-30-3 is applicable to causes of action arising
even before the amendment/ now, therefore, it is ORDERED:
1.

That the Motion to Dismiss of the defendant Salt Lake

County be, and hereby is, granted;
2.
be,

That the Motion to Dismiss of the defendant Sandy .City

and hereby is, "granted;
3.

be,

That the Motion to Dismiss of Dixie Six Corporation

and hereby is, denied.
DATED this

(Y

day of May, 1984.

ATTEST
H D'.XQi4 n«Nr*LEY

BY THE COURT:

Cff^//Vcuju6v

""" Scott Daniels
District Court Judge
APPROVED AS TO FORM:
I-

y

Rbde^Liv^hgston
Attorney for S a l t Lake County

%

(km

David Scofield
Attorney for Plaintiffs

Craig Adamson
Attorney for Defendant Dixie
Six Corporation

ATTIDAVIT OF SERVICE

;TATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF S^LT LAKE )
Cindy C. Lewis

, being sworn, says

that she is employed in the law offices of Snow, Christensc:
L Martineau, attorneys for Defendant Sandy City
herein, that she served the attached

in Civil Number

C84-0564

Order

Third District

Court

upon the following parties by placing a true and correct ccpy
thereof in an envelope addressed to:
David W. Schfield
Roger A. Livingston
PARSONS & CROWTHER
Attorneys for Defendant
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
Salt Lake County
455 South 300 East, Suite 300 231 East 400 South, Sui^e 400
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Salt Lake City, UT 84U1
Craig G. Adamson
Attorney for Defendant
Dixie Six Corporation
220 South 200 East, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

and causing the same to be mailed, first class, postage prepaid,
on the

17th

Ma

day of

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN
May

m,

y

before mfi^this

1984.

171t h

,
NOTARY PUBLIC

day of

ADDENDUM C

ROBERT H. HENDERSON
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN I KARTINEAU
Attorneys for Defendant
Irrigation Companies, Their
Presidents and Millard County
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
P. O. Box 3000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
Telephone: (801) 521-9000
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LULLARD COUNTY
. • .

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
FOR MILLARD COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
CLAYTON L. PALMER, and his
MARGARET D. PALMER,
Plaintiffs,
ORDER AND JUDGMENT

v.
STATE FARM INSURANCE COMPANY;
JOHN DOE INSURANCE COMPANY;
STATE OF UTAH; DEE C. HANSEN as
Utah State Engineer;
INTERMOUNTAIN POWER SERVICE
CORPORATION, a Utah corporation;
DELTA CANAL COMPANY; PHIL SMITH,
President of Delta Canal Company;
MELVILLE IRRIGATION COMPANY;*
QUINN SHEPHARD, President of
Melville Irrigation Company;
ABRAHAM IRRIGATION COMPANY;
RICHARD HENRIE, President of
Abraham Irrigation Company;
DESERZT IRRIGATION COMPANY;
ROGER STANWORTH, President of
Deseret Irrigation Company,
ROGER WALKER as Lower Sevier
River Commissioner; MILLARD
COUNTY; DELTA CANAL COMPANY,
MELVILLE IRRIGATION COMPANY,
ABRAHAM IRRIGATION COMPANY, and
DESERZT IRRIGATION COMPANY d/b/a
DMAD COMPANY; DZSZRET IRRIGATION
COMPANY and ABRAHAM IRRIGATION
COMPANY, d/b/a GUNNISON BEND DAM;
IRISH ANDERSON, TONY ANDERSON,
VINCENT CROPPER, GARY DUTSON,
LYLE STANKORTH, THOMAS ARLO S.
SKEEMS, the A*EL JENSEN ESTATE,
and JOHN DOE, Conk Water Users,
Defendants.

.:!*

Civil No. 7732

c:.-rk
Urputy

On August 15, 1984, the following Motions came on
regularly for hearing before the Honorable David Sam:
1.

Plaintiffs1 Motion for Chance of Venue.

2.

Defendants Phil C. Nielsonfs and Central Utah Water

Company's Motion to Quash.
3.

The Motions to Dismiss of the governmental entity

defendants.
4.

The Motions to Dismiss of the defendant Irrigation

Companies and their presidents.
5.

Defendant Intermountain Power Service Corporation's

Motion for Summary Judgment.
The plaintiffs were represented by Marcus G. Theodore.
The State defendants were represented by Dallin W. Jensen
and Michael M. Quealy.

The defendant Irrigation Companies fijnd

their presidents and defendant Millard County were represented
by Robert H. Henderson of the law firm Snow, Christensen &
Martineau.

Defendant Intermountain Power Service Corporation

was represented by Joseph Novak, of counsel, Snow, Christensen
& Martineau.
The Court having heard and considered the arguments of
counsel, and having reviewed the supporting affidavits and
memoranda on file, and the Court being fully advised in the
premises:
-2-

The Court concludes that Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-3 as
amended in 1984 provides absolute immunity to governmental
entities from suit for any injury or damage resulting from
management of flood waters and the construction, repair, and
operation of flood and storm systems by governmental entities;
the Court concludes that the 1984 amendment to Utah Code Ann.
§ 63-30-3 is applicable to causes of action arising even
before the amendment; the Court concludes that Utah Code Ann.
§ 63-30-10 provides immunity from suit for discretionary acts
relating to river operation, issuance of permits, and inspection
of cams and other facilities; the Court concludes that the acts
sued upon were governmental functions for which immunity has
not been waived and therefore the governmental entities are
immune from suit herein pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code
Ann. § 63-30-3 and § 63-30-10; the Court finds that on the
undisputed Affidavits on file there is no genuine issue of
fact and concludes that defendant Intermountain Power Service
Corporation is entitled to judgment of dismissal as a matter
of law; and the Court further concludes that the Amended
Complaint in its present form fails to give reasonable notice
to each defendant and fails to plead a factual basis for the
conclusory allegations of negligence.

Now therefore,

IT IS ORDERED:
1.

That the plaintiffs1 Motion for Change of Venue be,

and hereby is denied with leave to renew the Motion at the time
of impaneling the jury;

2.

That the Motion to Quash of the defendants Phil

Nielson and the Central Utah Water Company be, and hereby is
granted;
3.

That the Motions to Dismiss of the governmental

entity defendants, i.e. , the State of Utah, Dee C. Hansen, as
Utah State Engineer, Roger Walker, as Lower Sevier Commissioner,
and Millard County be, and hereby are converted into Motions for
Summary Judgment, and that said Motions for Summary Judgment be,
and hereby are granted;
4.

That the Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendant

Intermountain Power Service Corporation be, and hereby is granted;
5.

That the Motions to Dismiss of the defendant Presidents

of the Irrigation Companies in their individual capacities be,
and hereby are granted, with leave to the plaintiffs to amend
not later than 10 days from the date hereof to allege with
specificity acts of the Presidents taken in other than their
capacity as Presidents of the Irrigation Companies, if any there
be;
6.

That the Amended Complaint be, and hereby is dismissed

with leave to the plaintiffs to amend not later than 10 days from
the date hereof to set forth with specificity as to each
remaining defendant, other than the-governmental entity defendants
and defendant Intermountain Power Service Corporation, the factual
basis for the plaintiffs 1 claims.
Based thereon, now therefore, it is ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND
DECREED that:
Judgment be, and hereby is entered against plaintiffs,
_ _ . . j ^ ^ ^ r.iainfif^' Amended Complaint acainst

defendants State of Utah, Dee C. Hansen, as Utah State Engineer,
Roger Walker, as lower Sevier River Commissioner, and Millard
County; and that
Judgment be, and hereby is entered against plaintiffs,
dismissing with prejudice plaintiffs' Amended Complaint against
defendant Intermountain Power Service Corporation.
DATED this

&+J

day of August, 1984.
BY THE COURT:

DAVID SAM
District Court Judge
APPROVED AS TO FORM
prior to the signature and
entry by the Court:
Date:
ROBERT'H. ANDERSON
Attorney for Irrigation Companies,
frelr presidents^ and Millard County

fOSEPlTttOVAX <•
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Date :

lOAuCuit
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Attorney for Intermountain Power
Service Corporation
Date;
MARCUS G. THEODORE
Attorney for P l a i n t i f f

DAVID L. WILKINSON
Utah Attorney General^.
Date:
MICHAEL M. QJEJzZX
Assistant Attorney general
Attorney for Utah State Defendants

Ja /9P/

AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE
STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
Cindy C. Arnold

#

being sworn, says that she

is employed in the law offices of Snow, Christensen & Martineau,
attorneys for Defendants The Irrigation Companies, Their
Presidents, and Millard County herein, that she served the
attached

Proposed Order and Judgment

in Civil NumJber 7732, Fourth Judicial District Court upon
the following parties by placing a true and correct copy
thereof in an envelope addressed to
Marcus G. Theodore (Hand Delivered)
Attorney for Plaintiffs
Valley Tower, Suite 701
50 West Broadway
Salt Lake City, UT 84101

L. L. Summerhayes
STRONG & HANNI
Attorneys for Defendants
Anderson
604 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, UT 64111

Dallin Vf. Jensen
Michael Quealy
Attorneys for State Defendants
1636 West North Temple, #300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84116

Stephen R. Jackson
Millard County Attorney
P. O. Box 447
Delta, UT 84624

Joseph Novak (Hand Delivered)
Attorney for Defendant
Intermountain Power Service Corp.
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor
Salt Lake City, UT 84110
Henry Heath
Paul Belnap
STRONG fc HANNI
Attorneys for Defendant
State Farm
604 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

Thorpe Waddingham
P. 0. Box 777'
Delta, UT 84624
M. Dayle Jeffs
JEFFS fc JEFFS
Attorneys for Defendant Sk
90 North 100 East
P. 0. Box 683
Provo, UT 84603

and causing the sarr.e to be mailed, first class, postage prepaid,
on the c ^ ^ day of August, 1984.

-^^~C—a^i^L
SUBSCRIBED AND SKORN to before me thi

cay of Aucust,

IS8A

NOTARY PU3LIC
Residing a t : r & U & 0 & ^ & f J d s ^ ^ J r
ly Coirunission Expires:

I M . O! e v e W M I C ^ E Q CO'JJ.'TV CLERK AND EX-O^FICIO CLERK OF TKr
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1 . i .-«D CORRZ' T COr 1 O p THE OR'GINAL D O C J V . E N T NOW OJ
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DEPUTY CXERK

ADDENDUM D
DISTRICT COURT

c=> c;

I

ROBERT H. HENDERSON
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & KARTINEAU
Attorneys for Defendant
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
P. 0. Box 3000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
Telephone: (801) 521-90 00

JUL ] 0 1984

MILLARD COUNTY
Clerk
r\

±x

-'3-.,

—~Dc -uly

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
FOR MILLARD COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
FRANCIS B. CriESLZY and
NONA 3. CHESLEY,
Plaintiffs,

ORDER GRANTING
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

v.
DELTA CITY, a Municipal
corporation of the State
of Utah,

Civil No. 7486

Defendant.
The Defendant's

Motion for Summary Judgment came on

regularly before the Court pursuant to Rule 2.8 of the
Rules of Practice in the District Courts of the State of Utah.
The Court having reviewed the affidavits on filef the memoranda
of counsel, and being fully advised in the premises, and the
Court being of the opinion that Senate Bill 97 adopted by the
1984 Utah Legislature is an affirmation of the prior legislative
intent with regard to flood waters, and that the plaintiffs
claim is barred by Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-3 as amended, now,
therefore, it is ORDERED:

That defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment be, and
by is, granted.
DATED' this

ty£

d ay of Ss*^< 1984.
BY THE COURT:

Cullen Y./Christensen
District/Court Judqe

Arn^AviT or SEFVICI

STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF1SALT LAKE )
Cindy C. Lewis

st'i

,eir, - sv::rr,,

that she is employed in the law offices of Snow, Christen,
ittartinea-j,a:tcr:.evs for

Defendant

herein, that s^.e served the attached Proposed Order Granting
Summary Judgment

m

Civil Number

^

7486

,

Fourth District

:c-j.

uron the fcllcv:mc parties by placir.r a true and correct
n an envelrce addressed to:

Eldon A. Eliason
Attorney for Plaintiffs
Box 605
Delta, UT 84624

and causing the same to be mailed, first class, postage
on the

21st day of

June

r 19£4.

SUBSCRIBED AND S WORN t o b e f o r e
.Tnne

'

1 9 E4

•

me W i s

/ ./I:

21st

day

of

czzy

ADDENDUM E

& *_ .-i>mu«i < ULKK <0 "1 HI

DISTRICT COUTIT

2£*1
ROBERT H. HENDERSON
SNOW, CHRISTEt:SZH 6 KARTINEAU
Attorneys for the Irrigation Companies
and Their Presidents and Millard County
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
P. 0. Box'3000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
Telephone: (801) 521-9000

OCT - 3 1984
ttXLLARD COUNTY
Clerk
___ Oeputv

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF MILLARD COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
EVAH CONK FAIRCHILD,
Plaintiff,

STATE OF UTAH; DEE C. HANSEN
as UTAH STATE ENGINEER; DELTA
CANAL COMPANY; PHIL SMITH,
President of Delta Canal
Company; MELVILLE IRRIGATION
COMPANY; QUINN SHEPHARD,
President of Melville
Irrigation Company; ABRAHAM
IRRIGATION COMPANY; RICHARD
HENRIE, President of Abraham
Irrigation Company; DESERET
IRRIGATION COMPANY; ROGER
STANWORTH, President of
Deseret Irrigation Company;
ROGER WALKER, as Lower Sevier
River Commissioner; MILLARD
COUNTY; DELTA CANAL COMPANY,
MELVILLE IRRIGATION COMPANY,
ABRAHAM IRRIGATION COMPANY,
and DESERET IRRIGATION COMPANY
dba DMAD COMPANY; DESERET
IRRIGATION COMPANY and
ABRAHAM IRRIGATION COMPANY
dba GUNNISON BEND DAM; and
JOHN DOE CONSTRUCTION COMPANY,

ORDER, JUDGMENT AND
ORDER EXPRESSLY
DIRECTING ENTRY OF
JUDGMENT PURSUANT
TO RULE .54 (b)

Civil No.

7733

Defendants.
On September 21, 1984, the following Motions came on
regularly for hearing before the Honorable J. Robert Bullock

1.

Plaintiff's Motion to Arena Complaint; and

2.

The Motions to Dismiss of the defendants.

The plaintiff was represented by Marcus G. Theodore.
The State defendants were represented by Dallin W. Jensen
and Michael M. Quealy. The defendant Irrigation Companies and
their Presidents and defendant Millard County were represented
by Robert H. Henderson of the law firm Snow, Christensen & Martineau.
The Court having heard and considered the arguments of
counsel, and having reviewed the supporting affidavits and
memoranda on file, and the Court being fully advised in the
premises:
As to the Motions to Dismiss, the Court concludes that
Utah Code Ann. § 63*30-3 as amended in 1984 provides absolute
immunity to governmental entities from suit for any injury^r
damage resulting from management of flood waters and the
construction, repair, and operation of flood and storm systems
by governmental entities; the Court concludes that the 1984
amendment to Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-3 is applicable to causes
of action arising even before the amendment; the Court concludes
that Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10 provides immunity from suit for
discretionary acts relating to river operation, issuance of
permits, and inspection of dams and other facilities; the Court
concludes that the acts sued upon were governmental functions

for which immunity has not been waived and therefore the
governmental entities are immune from suit herein pursuant
to the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-3 and § 63-30-10;
and the Court further concludes that the Complaint in its
present form fails to give reasonable notice to each defendant
and fails to plead a factual basis for the conclusory allegations
of negligence.
As to Plaintiff's Motion to Amend Complaint, the Court
concludes that the Motion is untimely and that the plaintiff
has failed to offer any explanation for the untimeliness of
the Motion; the Court further concludes that the Proposed
Amendment would be futile in that, inter alia, it proposes to
name as a defendant the insurer of the Irrigation Companies,
its proposes to name Intermountain Power Service Corporation, an
entity that, on the undisputed facts, had no ownership interest
whatsoever in the Irrigation Companies, used no water from the
Sevier River, and at no time participated in the activities of
which plaintiff complains, it proposes to name plaintiff's own
insurer, it would still fail to give reasonable notice to
each defendant and still fails to plead a factual basis for
the conclusory allegations of negligence, and in that it still
would not, and could not, state a civil rights claim under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 because, as a matter of law, the one time
flood that occurred does not constitute a "taking".
Now, therefore, IT IS ORDERED:

1.

That the plaintiff's Morion for Leave to Amend

be, and hereby is denied;
2.

That the Motions to Dismiss of the governmental

entity defendants, i.e., the State of Utah, Dee C. Hansen, as
Utah State Engineer, Roger Walker, as Lower Sevier Commissioner,
and Millard County be, and hereby are granted;
3.

That the Motions to Dismiss of the Defendant

Presidents of the Irrigation Companies in their individual
capacities be, and hereby are granted, with leave to the
plaintiff to amend not later than 10 days from_ the date hereof
to allege with specificity acts of the Presidents taken in other
than their capacity as Presidents of the Irrigation Companies,
if any there be;
4.

That the Complaint be, and hereby is dismissed

with leave to the plaintiff to amend not later than 10 da/s
from the date hereof to set forth with specificity as to each
remaining defendant,

other than the governmental entity

defendants, the factual basis for the plaintiff f s claims.
Based thereon, now therefore, it is ORDERED, ADJUDGED
AND DECREED that:
Judgment be, and hereby is entered against plaintiff,
dismissing with prejudice plaintiff's Complaint against
defendants State of Utah, Dee C. Hansen, as Utah State Engineer,
Roger Walker, as Lower Sevier River Commissioner, and Millard
County.

The Court hereby expressly determines that there is
no just reason for delay and hereby expressly directs that
this Judgment and the Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion for
Leave to Amend be entered as a final judgment within the
meaning of Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
DATED this

^r

^^cay of

, 1984

~/3T Robert Bullock
{district Court Judge
APPROVED AS TO FORM
prior to the signature and
entry by the Court:

Date

Z7SfiPTrf5J

ROBERT H. HENDERSON
Attorney for Irrigation Companies
their Presidents, and Millard
County
Date:
MARCUS G. THEODORE
Attorney for Plaintiff
DAVID L. WILKINSON
Utah Attorney Generc
/Lt

A s s i s t a n t Attorney/General
Attorney for Utah s t a t e
Defendants

Date: Sft~c27 *

/ft"/

AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE

STATE OF UTAH
ss •
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )

Cindv C. Arnold

, being sworn, says that she

is employed in the law offices of Snow, Christensen

& Kartineau,

attorneys for Defendants The Irrigation Companies, Their
Presidents, and Millard County herein, that she served the
attached

Order, Judgment and Order Expressly Directing

Entry of Judgment Pursuant to Rule 54(b)

in Civil Number 7733, Fourth Judicial District Court upon
the following parties by placing a true and correct copy
thereof in an envelope addressed to:
Marcus G. Theodore (Hand Delivered)
Attorney for Plaintiffs
Valley Tower, Suite 701
50 West Broadway
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Dallin W. Jensen
Michael Quealy
Attorneys for State Defendants
1636 West North Temple, #300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84116
Joseph Novak
Attorney for Defendant
Intermountain Power Service Corp.
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor
Salt Lake City, UT 84110
Kenry Heath
Paul Belnap
STRONG S HANKI
Attorneys for Defendant
State Farm
604 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

L. L. Summerhayes
STRONG k HANKI
Attorneys for Defendants
Anderson
604 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Stephen R. Jackson
Millard County Attorney
P. O. Box 447
Delta, UT
84624
Thorpe Waddingham
P. 0. Box 777
Delta, UT
84624
M. Dayle Jeffs
JEFFS & JEFFS
Attorneys for Defendant Skeems
90 North 100 East
P. O. Box 683
Provo # UT
84603

and causing the sarr.e to be mailed, first class, postage prepaid
on the

27th

day of

September

^ a

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this
September

__, 1984.

27th

day of

, 19 8 4.

0*/£,„,. J' -^LJ^
V
NOTARY
PUBLIC
"Residmc
in Salt
Lake City, UT
My Commission Expires:

t/toh

^OU^Th • *
STA^E C ; '
TRUE A'.-' -'••
FILE AND OF ^ *
WITNESS t.'V t"

- - . . -v/ r,LPq»< AND EX-0FF1CK3 CLERK O f THr
* * <f> AND FOR MILLARD COUNT\
.r . " M r =OREGO'»NG IS A FULL
1

Or- IV-'E OzK-'r ->L DOCUMENT NOW Of-

">' OFF.CF AS SUC- C'.ER/v
SEAL OF SAID COUTT TH«S
A 0 , 1> 3

.,-*:o

tL

ADDENDUM F

153* OCT 3 0 IK 9 5 ?
R03ERT H. HENDERSON
SNOV:, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Defendant Orem City
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
P. O. Box 3 00 0
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
Telephone: (801) 521-9000
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL

*7.fcLUN.rJ'

JL.

DISTRICT

.!)!

COURT

FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
RUSSELL MENDENHALL; SARAH
JAN BURY; BRENT STARK;
ROBERT CONOVER and VALERIE
CONOVER, his wife,
Plaintiffs,
ORDER AND JUDGMENT
v.
UNIVERSITY MALL, INC., a
corporation; OREM CITY
CORPORATION, a municipal
corporation; MERRILL
GAPPMAYER,

Civil No. 62,597

Defendants.
Defendant Orem City's Motion for Summary Judgment came
on for oral argument on October 26, 1984.

Plaintiffs were

represented by Thomas S. Taylor of the law firm Christensen,
Taylor & Moody.

Defendant Orem City was represented by

Robert H. Henderson of the law firm Snow, Christensen & Martineau.
The Court having heard the argument of counsel, and
having reviewed and considered the memoranda on file, and
being fully advised in the premises:

The Court concludes that Utah Code Annotated § 63-30-3
as amended in 1984 provides absolute immunity to governmental
entities from suit for any injury or damage resulting from
management of flood waters and the construction, repair,
and operation of flood and storm systems by governmental
entities; the Court concludes that the 1984 amendment to
the Utah Code Annotated § 63-30-3 is applicable to causes of
action arising even before the amendment; the Court concludes
that the acts Orem City has been sued upon were governmental
functions for which immunity has not been waived and "that,
therefore, the governmental entity, Orem City, is immune from
suit herein pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code Annotated
§ 63-30-3.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that:
Judgment be, and hereby is entered against plaintiffs and in
favor of the defendant Orem City dismissing with prejudice
plaintiffs' Complaint against defendant Orem City*
DATED this

<^V

day of October, 1984.
BY THE COURT:

J?J2S

/
George E, aTlif
District Cour t Judg6

A " : DAVIT OF SERVICE
STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
Cindy C. Arnold

, being sworn, says

that she is enployed in the law offices of Snow, Chnstense.n
£ Kartineau, attorneys for

Defendant Orem City

herein, that she served the attached

in Civil Nunber

62,597

,

Proposed Order and Judgment

Fourth District

Court

upon the following parties by placing a true zr.z correct

cczy

thereof in an envelope addressed to:
Thomas S. Taylor
CHRISTENSEN, TAYLOR & MOODY
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
55 East Center Street
P. O. Box 14 66
Provo, UT 84603

Merrill Gappmayer
1156 South State Street
Suite 202
Orem, UT 84057
Paul S. Felt
400 Deseret Building
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

Bryce McEuen
Orem City Attorney
56 North State Street
Orem, UT 84057

and causing the sane to be mailed, first class, postage prepaid,
on the

26th

day cf

October

SU5SCRIEED AND SKORN to before meMihis
October

, 19 54.

, 1984 .

26th

day of

ADDENDUM G

FLOOD RELIEF - 1984
1964
BUDGET SESSION
Enrolled Copy
S. B. No. 97
AN

ACT

By

RELATING

GOVERNMENTAL

TO

FLOODING;

FUNCTION

FOR

fred W.

Finlmson

CLARIFYING

FLOODING

PURPOSES

OF

AS

GOVERNMENTAL

PROVIDES AS CRITERIA FOR TnE DR3 FUNDING MULTI-

IMMUNITY;

COUNTY FLOOD DAMACE; GIVING EMERCENCY FLOOD TONERS TO
STATE

A

ENGINEER;

CREATING

THE

A TASK FORCE TO LOOK AT INTER-

COUNTY FI/>OD!NG; STATING THAT IT IS IN THE BEST

INTERESTS

<JF THE STATE AND ITS POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS TO MANACE TtiE
STATE'S BODIES OF WATER; APPROPRIATING FUNDS FOR FLOODING;
AND PROVIDING AN EFFECTIVE
THIS

ACT

DATE.

AMENDS SECTION 63-30-3, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 19S3, AS

ENACTED BY CHAPTER 116, LAWS OF UTAH 1981, AND SECTION 63S2a-10,

UTAH

15, LAWS OF

CODE
UTAH

ANNOTATED 1953, AS ENACTED BY CHAPTER
1983,

FIRST

SPECIAL

SESSION;

ENACTS

SECTIONS 63-52a-1.5 AND 73-2-22, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953,
AND ENACTS NEW MATERIAL.
B e

. . -11. enacted bv
Section

the Legislature of the State of Utah:

1.

Section 63-30-3, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as

last amended by Chapter 116, Lavs of Utah 1981, is

amended

to

read:
63-30-3.

Except

as

may

be

otherwise provided in this

jaetj chapter, all governmental entities are inaune
foi

any

injury

which

«l«»v«"i iiiitfii I a 1 luii' t M m ,
hoMif,

«»t

results

from

the

(jovei nmcnla ] ] y-own^J

exercise
hor.p J to I ,

ol IM-I M'»V«-I nmcnt.i J hedlth c *•? * - l.icjhty,

• tppt <«v«*tl nifd 11 ."> I , nut ;.j itcj, oi other

from

pi ol «.•:.:. i una 1

a\\0

suit
of

a

nil) Z) n<)
fiom an

health

care

S. 5. No

97

clinical training program concucted in either public 01 piivate
facilities.
The
repair,

management

of

and

operation

governmental

entities

flood
of

waters

flood

are

and

considered

are

immune

from

suit

the construction,

storm

systems

to

governmental

be

and _ the 1 r_ of fj cers

functions ,_ and governmental entities
employees

and

for

any

miury

by

and

or damage

resulting from those activities.
Section

2.

Section 63-523-10, Utah Code Annotated 2953,

as enacted by Chapter 15, Laws

of

Utah

1983,

First

Special

Session, is amended to read:
63-52a-10.
funds granted
subdivision

(1)
under

shall

this

a

condition of any disaster relief

chapter,

the

receiving

political

agree that any repair or construction to be

financed therewith
standards

As

shall

be

in

accordance

with

applicable

of safety, decency, and sanitation and in conformity

with applicable codes, specifications, and standards, and shall
furnish such evidence of compliance with this section as may be
required by the DRB.
disaster

relief

political
the

grant

under

condition

this

of

chapter,

receiving
the

subdivision r,hal) agree Hint tho nntuidl

nic;i..

in

receiving
ha;;;»i Or.

hazards,

appiopnate

including

safe

action
land

use

taken
and

to

in

nutjyate

construction

practices, in accordance with standards prescribed or
by

a

wlij'li U K - puKt'cd:. ol U»»- MI.nit.. ,n <• to !>«• u..»-d

will be evaluated and
those

As a further

approved

the DRB after adequate consultation with the governing body

of the political subdivision to which the grant is to be
(2)

Whenever

relief funds
potential

for

for

the
a

DRB

considers a request for disaster

political

multiple

made.

subdivision

county

flood

and

damage,

there

is

a

the political

subdivision must provide the DR£ with information on the effect
any prefect has on downstream c_ount:es_

That infoimation 5,hall

be considered as part of the DRB' s cnteiia foi
funding.

2-

approving

the

S. 5

No. 97
Section

3.

Section 73-2-22, Utah Code Annotated 1953, is

enacted to read:
73-2-2_2

Whenever

the

state engineer, with approval of

the chairman of the Disaster Emergency Advisory Council,
a

written

finding that any reservoir or stream has reached or

will reach during the current water year
above

makes

average

a

level

far

enough

and in excess of capacity that public safety is

or is likely to be

endangered

damage _ i s _o_c cu r r i_ng

or

or

is

that

likely

substantial
to

property

occur, he shall have

emergency powers until the danger to the public and property is
abated.

Emergency

powers

control stream flow and
state

engineer

must

shall

reservoir
protect

consist of the authority to
storage

existing

or

water

release.
rights

The
to the

maximum extent possible when exercising emergency powers.
action

Any

taken by the state engineer under this section shall be

by written order.
If any person refuses or neglects to comply with any order
of the state engineer issued pursuant to his emergency

powers,

the state engineer may bring action in the name of the state in
the district court

to

enforce

them.

emergency

the

state

engineer

powers,

In

carrying

shall

out

his

have rights of

access to private and public property.
Any

person

affected

by a decision of the state engineer

made under his emergency powers shall have the
injunctive

lelief,

right

to

seek

including temporary l e s t i a m m g orders a_nd

tempoinry injunctions in any district court of the comity where
that

peison

lesioes

No order of the state engineer shall be

enjoined or set aside unless
evidence

that

shown

by

cf

Sections

73-3-14

and

or

convincing

capricious.

73-3-15

applicaple to any crdei of the state engineer
to this section.

and

an emergency does not in fact exist or that the

order of the state engineer is arbitrary
previsions

clear

shall
issued

not

The
be

pursuant

S. B. No. 97
Section 4.

There is created a Flood Control Task Force to

study inter-ccunty flooding problems.

The task foice shall

be

comprised of the following representatives:
(1)

to be appointed by the Governor:

(a)

a member _representinq the ciovernoi ;

(b)

a

merr.Dei

lepic: cut NI«I

the

Dej^i J t imjn l

of N,itwr<»]

Resource.";
(c)

fou_r members ^present i nrj the counties;

(d)

three members represeiit:iig_cities and towns;

(e)

three

members representing water users, two of whom

must have irrigation interests;
(2)

be appointed

to

by the house chairman of the Energy

and Natural Resources Study Committee, four house members;
(3)

to be appointed by the senate chairman of the Energy

and Narural Resources Study Committee, three senate members.
The

task force shall prepare a plan to solve the problems

of multiple county flood control jurisdiction and shall

report

that plan to the 19S5 General Session of _the_ legislature^
Section

5.

Section 63-52a-1.5>, Utah Code Annotated 1953,

is enacted to read:
63-52a-1.5.

The

legislature

finds that unusual weather

conditions in the last several ye a rs
levels m

have

caused

high

the state's streams, reservoirs, and lakes.

the best interest cf the state and its

political

water

It is in

subdivisions

to manage those bodies of water.
Section 6.

The following appropriations are made from the

General Fund for fiscal year 19S3/84:
COMMUNITY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
Item 1.

To Coirjr.unit y Development/Pisaster
Relief Board for addressing
the following possible needs:
a.

1983 unmet flood needs

b.

Dredging requests on
Jordan, Spanish Fork,_ and

$13,400,000

$20, 600, 000

S

E. No. 97
I'l <>\>t, h v t ' i s

1 ,400,000

c

FEN*- p:ojects_ fiom 19S_3

d

19S4 flood mi t: £i_a t i_on

e.

To be used in emeuiency

500, 000
4_, S00 000

situations vhei_e thei e i s
an impending health or
safety threat that has not
otherwise been provided for 1,000,000
These

funds

shall

f_iscal_ year
amounts

not lapse at the end of

19S3/S4

shall

cairy

£^cL__fLnY
over

unexpended

to

fiscal year

} \ } • . the i n U n t of the le«ji«-latue

I984/RS

that the DKC cjjve top piiori^y

to mi ticjati/icj

the flood damage potential along the
length

of

the Jordan River

It is further

the intent of the legislature that
may

use

funds

participate

entire

the

DRB

not otherwise encumbered to

with

a

project

sponsor

to

purchase liability insurance.
FU5LIC SAFETY
Item 2.

To Commissioner's Office
To

cover

costs __for

the

2, 600,000
Lower

Diversion

Tunnel and clean up measures at Thistle.
These

funds

fiseal
amounts

sha 11_

year

1983,84

shall

carry

not_lapse at the end of
and
over

any

unexpended

to

fiscal year

1984/85.
However,

if

there is FEMA participation or

other savings in these projects,
equal

to

that

participation

an
or

amount
project

savings shall lapse
Item 3

To Commissioner's Office

20,000

S. 5. Nc. 97
To

cover expenses associ ated_ wi th_ fJ.ood_ing_.

a.

Copy work on dnta

sc\)\

to FEMA
b.

$ 5,000

Internal^aud:toi
billings

being

to

rmdit

proces^od

by FEMA
Item 4.

To Highway Patrol
To

Item S.

15, 000
100, 000

cover expenses associated with flooriino.

To Comprehensive Emergency Management
a.

800,000 sandbags

b.

Overtime

c.

Large capacity __umps (1Q)

d_.

Heavv_ equipment, pi lvnte

$271 , 000
7 , 000
78, 0_00

.46<99_9

aircraft rentals
e.

Emergency Operating Center
operations

f.

564,000

12,000

State's share of individual
family grant program for
1984 flooding

These

funds

fiscal

year

a_moun_t_5

shall

150,000
not lapse at the end

1983/84

shall

carry

and

of

any

unexpended

over _to

_fiscal year

1984/85.
Item 6.

To Commissioner's Office
To

125 , 000

provide the state's match for individual

and family federal grant assistance provided
during 1983 flooding.
NATURAL RESOURCES
Item 7.

7

To Utah Geological and Mineral Survey
To

cover

projected

overtime

, 300

for _1984

flooding.
Item 8.

To Wildlife Resources
To

cover

expenses

10,000
of

diking

residences at state bird refuges.

-6-

around

S. E

No. 97

It err, 9.

To Parks and Recreation
To

69S( 000

cover expenses associated with floodinc.

Iter. 10. To Water Fesources
To

covei

700,000

expenses

of_ the development and

imp I ernent_a_tion of a state water
plan

shall

propose

and

basins.

the

The

management

m

certain

lack

plan

of

hydrologic

water

shall

throuch

The

long-term solutions to

the excess of water
basins

plan.

m

other

consider

water

trans-basin

diversion.

The purpose of the plan shall be to maximize
the

use of available water for a a n cul ture,

municipal,

industrial,

recreation,

and

wildlife uses within the state.
As

part

of

the

plan,

the division shall

prepare a list of water development proiects
that

are

complementary to one another with

estimated costs

and

probable

engineering,

economic,

environmental

feasibility.

and

The plan shall focus particular emphasis
the

Bear

River

and Utah Lake drainage but

wi_l_l _include all_ hydrologic
state.

The

areas

of

the

plan shall identify the impact

of that system on the economic base
state,

on

and

of

the

on flooding problems, and shall

prioritize the most feasible prefects.
The

divisi on shall rake periodic reports to

the

Energy

Committee

and
and

Natural
the

Study Committee.
its

Resources

Agriculture

Study

and Health

The division shall

report

findings to the 19SS General Session of

the legislature
The

funds

f-^r*l

shall

ufiar-

not

-act r. \

lapse
-~~>

at the end_of
•*

S

E. No

97
aiBCjr.ts

shall

carry

over

to

fiscal year

1964/85
HEALTH
It err, 11.

To Administration
To

cover

300, 000

expenses

of

mosquito

activities and diking to protect

abatement
wastewater

treatment plants.
AGRICULTURE
It err 12.

To Agriculture Resource Development
Loan Fund

1 . 000_, 000

To cover expenses
These

of loan", to faimci.*-;.
not 1 apse

fund . >.hn3 1

fiscal

year

amounts

1963/64

shall

and

carry

over

«it the unci of

any

unexpenced

to

fiscal year

1984/85.
TRANSPO_RTAT1 ON
Item 13.

To State Construction

To_ _c_cver

expenses

1,000,000

o_£

e m e_ ra eii£v_ work

on

highways.
These

funds

fiscal

shall

yeai
r

.jinount .

not lapse a_t_ the end of

1983/84

: )\.i I 1

and

r,n ) y

nny

ovo

to

unexp'-nd'-d
} i ..( .i I y .i i

1984/85
NATIONAL GUARD
Iter 14.

To Administration
To

cover

518, 000

expenses

of

air force missions,

army air support, and personnel
These

funds

fiscal
amounts

shall

year

1983/64

shall

carry

not lapse at the end of
and
over

any

unexpended

to

fiscal year

1954/65.
Section

7

This

the governor, or tr.e

cay

act shall take effect upon_a£piova 1 by
following

-6-

the

constitutional

time

S. B. No. 97
limit

of Article VII, Sec. 8 without the governor's signature,

or in the case of veto, the date of veto override.

